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BUSING TO DESEGREGATE SCHOOLS: THE PERSPECTIVE
FROM CONGRESS
Hugh Scott*
In the end, I expect that the courts will solve the problem-not
Congress.'
The controversy over transporting pupils to desegregate schools or
"busing" as the issue popularly is known, is the narrowest and
perhaps most limited aspect of school desegregation. Yet, it threat-
ens to undo school desegregation completely unless the issue is re-
solved in a way which will permit continued desegregation of schools
accompanied by the understanding and support of the majority of
people of all races.
A year ago it seemed virtually assured that Congress would pass
a major anti-busing law. That event was averted in the Senate when
the anti-busing forces were unable to force cloture of the debate on
the "Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972"2 and failed to
defeat a subsequent motion to proceed to other business.3
*United States Senator from Pennsylvania; Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee;
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1922.
1. Birmingham News, Feb. 21, 1972, at 8, col. 8.
2. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., introduced on March 20, 1972; reported from the
General Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, July 25,
1972; reported from Committee on August 14, 1972, H.R. Rep. No. 92-1335; considered and
passed the House of Representatives with amendment, August 17 and 18, 1972.
H.R. 13915 and the accompanying measure, the Student Transportation Moratorium Act
of 1972, H.R. 13916, were the subjects of extensive hearings in both the House Committee on
the Judiciary and the Committee on Education and Labor.
3. 118 CONG. REc. at S17053, S17169, S17232, S17304, S17497, S17597 (daily eds. October
5, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1972).
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This turn of events resulted from several factors. First, Congress
earlier in the year had enacted important guidelines on the use of
pupil transportation as a means of school desegregation.4 Second,
many members of Congress had confidence in the discretion of the
Supreme Court to limit excessive busing on a case by case basis,
while at the same time formulating well-reasoned and appropriate
guidelines for the lower courts to follow in asserting decrees. Third,
the legislative proposals to limit busing went far beyond what was
reasonable or necessary. Instead, the proposed "Equal Educational
Opportunity Act," as passed by the House of Representatives, vir-
tually repealed substantial portions of the Civil Rights Acts and
guaranteed that desegregation would never occur in some metropoli-
tan areas.' The bill actually made possible re-segregation in those
cities and towns found to have racially segregated neighborhoods.
Fourth, many of the members of Congress were convinced that anti-
4. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 372.
Title VIII of the General Education Amendments of 1972 provides essentially:
Section 801 states that no provision of the Act "shall be construed to require the assignment
or transportation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbalance."
Section 802(a) prohibits the use of federal funds
-to transport students or to buy buses in order to overcome racial imbalance;
-for busing to carry out a plan of desegregation "except on the express written
voluntary request of appropriate local school officials;"
-to provide for transportation if the time or distance is so great as to threaten the
health or impinge on the educational process of children;
-to provide transportation, if such transportation would result in children being
assigned to a school substantially inferior to the one they would be assigned to under
a non-discriminatory geographic zone assignment plan.
Section 802 (b) prohibits Federal officials from requiring the use of non-federal funds for
busing to correct racial imbalance or achieve desegregation or to condition a grant of Federal
funds on student transportation plans "unless constitutionally required."
Section 803 postpones the effectiveness of any district court order "which requires the
transfer or transportation of any student or students . . . for the purpose of achieving a
balance among students with respect to race, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status" until all
appeals have been exhausted or until January 1, 1974.
Section 804 gives parents the right to intervene in desegregation suits if busing standards
violate Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Section 805 requires rules of evidence in desegregation cases to be uniform throughout the
United States.
Section 806 expresses the intent that Section 407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall
be applied uniformly.
5. H.R. 13915, as passed by the House of Representatives, August 18, 1972, Senate Calen-
dar No. 1042.
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busing legislation was not only unwise but unconstitutional as well.
In this article it is suggested that we now have established princi-
ples, through legislation by Congress and decisions of the courts,
within which we can resolve the complexities of limiting pupil trans-
portation in a fair and practical manner without resegregating
schools.
The greatest single reason for the impasse between opposing
groups in the debate over school desegregation has been the ada-
mant and mutual refusal of both sides to recognize and respect what
has been accomplished in school desegregation and the nature of the
problems yet unresolved. Those who oppose pupil transportation to
desegregate schools often give the impression that they have con-
veniently forgotten the recent history of schemes to evade Constitu-
tional mandates. On the other hand, the proponents of busing often
appear blind to the fact that desegregation is accepted today by an
overwhelming majority of people, including many who once vehe-
mently opposed it.6
The point has been reached where the issue of good faith should
no longer be a major element of any debate about a remedy. Con-
gress, the courts and the executive have demonstrated repeatedly
that they find another era of segregation constitutionally unaccepta-
ble. Happily, there are indications that the country may be able to
reason its way through some of the knotty and complex problems
of desegregation without becoming embroiled in accusations of bad
faith and the accompanying recriminations.
In devising remedies which will be fair and which will be sup-
ported by the majority of people, it must be kept in mind that we
are no longer dealing with modest rural school districts, but with
major school systems such as those in the metropolitan areas of
Richmond, Atlanta, Denver and Detroit.7 National policy must
continue to be committed to integration, but the implementation of
that policy must be fair and flexible and must have the broad based
6. An opinion poll analysed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights shows that sixty-seven
percent of the public support integration as a national objective. U.S. COMMSSION ON CML
RIGHTS, PuBLic KNOWLEDGE AND BUSING OPPOSITION: AN INTERPRETATION OF A NEW NATIONAL
SuRvEY (1973).
7. The analysis of the poll prepared by the Commission, supra note 6, indicates that among
those who support integration as a national goal only twenty-seven percent support busing
to achieve integration.
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support of the people. The potential for devising a fair and flexible
means of implementing desegregation is available, but building
understanding and support among people generally appears to be
the greatest challenge. This can be accomplished, however, if, as a
first step, confrontations are avoided, and reasoned debate is em-
ployed in. order to achieve the national goal of a desegregated so-
ciety.
Twenty years ago this May 17 the Supreme Court announced its
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education.' It is a mark of
the passage of time that only one justice who was a member of that
Court, Justice William 0. Douglas, is still a member of the Supreme
Court; it is a mark of what we have accomplished that the man who
argued the cause of the black plaintiffs in Brown sits today as the
first black justice of the Court. That Justice is Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who was appointed by a Southern President.
Shortly after the decision in Brown, the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia vowed "massive resistance." Today, Virginia's schools for the
most part are desegregated. A distinguished Virginian, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., is an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and has
contributed valuable insights and great intellect to solving the prob-
lems of desegregation since his recent appointment to the Court.
The progress of the past twenty years has not been easy. Prior to
Brown, racial segregation under law was the accepted way of life in
the southern states. All schools and public facilities were segregated
by race. Public transportation was segregated, and the law required
the private businessman to operate segregated places of accommo-
dation. The masses of black citizens were denied the right to vote.
Where the law did not require segregation, racial discrimination and
custom imposed an equal effect. Discrimination against blacks in
employment and housing was the rule everywhere.
The legacy and effect of de jure segregation spilled over into the
north where racial discrimination was practiced openly and often in
defiance of state laws prohibiting discriminatory practices. In the
year 1954, the black man, ninety years after Emancipation, was
confronted with social policies that were in many respects as de-
grading as involuntary servitude. Brown v. Board of Education over-
ruled this epitaph. Since that decision, this nation has been headed
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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steadily on a course toward full equality of opportunity for every
citizen and toward the elimination of the vestiges of segregation
from every aspect of our lives. I doubt if there are many today who
would vote to overturn Brown and return to a "separate but equal"
society.
Ten years after Brown little progress had been made to desegre-
gate schools except in the border states and the District of Colum-
bia.' The spectacle of United States Army troops surrounding Cen-
tral High School in Little Rock, Arkansas forced this country to
realize that desegregation on a case by case basis would be a long
term and tumultuous proposition. It was clear that unless voluntary
compliance with the letter and spirit of Brown was forthcoming, and
that did not appear to be likely, little was going to happen until
Congress acted.
Effective congressional action did not come easy. From Recon-
struction until 1957 no general action had been taken by the Con-
gress to require implementation of the fourteenth amendment. The
first steps by Congress toward enacting guarantees of full and equal
citizenship were taken during the Eisenhower-Nixon Administra-
tion in 1956 and 1957. The initial actions taken by Congress seemed
timid to critics, but in reality they were precedent-shattering moves
which cleared away several time-encrusted procedural obstacles to
the passage of civil rights legislation. The first procedural move was
the decision by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson to use
a relatively weak civil rights bill as the vehicle for breaking the
traditional southern filibuster against civil rights legislation. At
that time, many did not realize the true proportions of this proce-
dural victory, but without it, the great civil rights acts of the 1960's
would have been virtually impossible to enact.
The 1957 Civil Rights Act,'0 modest in dimensions and ambitions,
9. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in its 1961 Report, Vol. 2, Education, reported
that in May 1961, 775 out of 2,837 biracial school districts in 17 states and the District of
Columbia had reported some desegregation. The overall increase since the Commission's 1959
report was said to be only 1.5 percent. 1961 U.S. COMMISSION ON CVmL RIGHTS REPORT, EDUCA-
Tno BOOK 2, at 39, app. IV.
In 1964, only 2.25 percent of the Negro children in the 11 states of the old Confederacy and
10.9 percent in the entire region encompassing the southern and border states attended school
with white children. Over 3 million Negro children in 1964 were attending segregared schools
in the south. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIvIm RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-1966, at 1 (1966).
10. Act of September 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
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has proven to be the base on which a large part of the federal civil
rights effort has been founded. The Act created the United States
Commission on Civil Rights to study civil rights problems and to
report to the nation, the Congress and the President. The Commis-
sion is still serving the nation and will continue to so serve through
its current extension until 1978.
Title II of the Act of 1957 also created the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice. This is perhaps the most substantial
achievement of the Act. Title IV authorized the Attorney General
to go into court to enforce the right of all citizens to vote under the
fifteenth amendment. This brought the federal government into
court on the side of civil rights plaintiffs. No longer would the gov-
ernment be a powerless or neutral observer on the sidelines. It now
was actively committed to securing the civil rights of all citizens.
Obviously, this development did not go unchallenged by those
states and localities which felt threatened by the use of federal
power to protect and secure the rights of citizens under the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments. "Massive resistance" in Virginia
and elsewhere was the most organized challenge to federal author-
ity. Violence and confrontation, often incited by demagoguery, oc-
curred throughout the south while the north looked on, all too com-
placently, from the sidelines. During this period a growing aware-
ness, sharpened by the reports of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, developed that desegregation of schools was only one
part of a struggle for equal opportunity which was taking place on
several fronts simultaneously. The first report of the Civil Rights
Commission in 1959 dealt with voting, education and housing. The
report made it clear that progress in each area was dependent upon
progress being made in the other areas as well. To attempt to find
a priority target was to search for the beginning of a circle. It was
against such a background that Congress moved to consider the
major civil rights acts of the 1960's.
Overall, the Civil Rights Act of 1960" was a disappointment.' 2
The strong recommendations of the Civil Rights Commission, which
had provided the impetus for the legislation, were systematically
11. Act of May 6, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86.
12. For an excellent account of the legislative history of the 1960 Civil Rights Bill, see
BERMAN, How A BiLL BECAME LAW (1962).
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weakened and replaced until few of substance remained. The Act
was generally viewed as a failure.
Despite increased national focus on the civil rights movement, the
first two years of the Kennedy Administration passed without any
civil rights action by Congress. Litigation became the chosen
weapon of the Administration for achieving civil rights. Since the
only source of effective civil authority possessed by the Attorney
General was in the field of voting, the belief was that school desegre-
gation and other gains would come about through an expansion of
the political process resulting from greater enfranchisement of Ne-
groes.
Despite heroic and dedicated efforts by outstanding lawyers in the
Civil Rights Division, the Department of Justice was not successful
in vindicating civil rights for Negro citizens through the judicial
process. At the end of 1962, the additional number of black citizens
who could vote as a result of cases brought by the Department was
small.' 3 Equally small was the amount of school desegregation
achieved through private litigation.'4
At the start of the 88th Congress, the Kennedy Administration
had virtually no civil rights legislative program. The Administra-
tion's civil rights bill in early 1963 consisted of a modest proposal
to extend the life of the Commission on Civil Rights and to expand
the Commission's jurisdiction to provide clearinghouse services.' 5
Liberal Republicans in the House and the Senate joined with Demo-
crats in seizing the initiative with strong civil rights proposals point-
ing the way for major civil rights enactments. Elsewhere in the
nation the civil rights movement increased its momentum.
Events in Birmingham, Alabama in April, 1963 suddenly ignited
the conscience of the nation. Police Commissioner Eugene "Bull"
Connor, his dogs and fire hoses, and the bombings, riotings and rage
of the inner city shocked the people of America. On June 12, 1963
Medgar Evers was ambushed and killed in front of his home in
Jackson, Mississippi. On June 19, the Kennedy Administration fi-
nally sent a major new civil rights bill to Congress. During a
13. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PoLrTCAL PARTICIPATION 10 (1968).
14. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 5
(1967).
15. Civil Rights Message of the President, Feb. 28, 1963.
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summer-long consideration of the bill, the great march on Washing-
ton took place. There, Dr. Martin Luther King intoned his greatest
speech, "I Have a Dream," but Congress did not act.
In the autumn of 1963, the President was assassinated in Dallas.
The death of President Kennedy may not have been responsible for
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it did cause many people to realize
that the time for making the ideal of social justice a reality was long
overdue. Against a somber, more responsible background, Congress
duly considered and enacted that monumental charter of civil
rights, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16
The Act carried forward the concept of making basic gains in
equal opportunity simultaneously on several fronts, notably in
public accommodations, education, employment and non-
discrimination in federal programs. The work of the 1964 Act subse-
quently was completed by passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965' 7
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.18
The 1964 Civil Rights Act also provided for double-barreled im-
plementation of desegregation of schools and of federal programs in
the states. One implementation was administrative sanctions im-
posed by the secretaries and heads of agencies charged with enforc-
ing the nondiscriminatory requirements of Title VI.'9 The other im-
plementation was the power of the Attorney General to bring suit
to desegregate schools.2" With the enactment of substantial assis-
tance programs for education, school administrators and officials
were faced with hard choices: to forego federal financial assistance
only to face the Department of Justice in Court in the end, or to give
assurances of nondiscrimination, follow desegregation guidelines
and take the money. The majority of school boards decided to take
steps toward compliance.
Education was not the only sector of society required to accept
desegregation. The 1964 Act achieved quick desegregation of places
of public accommodation, and other sectors of society also began to
desegregate. Additionally, employers were required to eliminate dis-
criminatory business practices. The pervasive impact of the Voting
16. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
17. Act of August 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
18. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970).
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Rights Act of 1965 also made itself felt as black voters joined with
white moderates to oust from office those public officials who had
counseled and led resistance to desegregation. 21
What had been accomplished through legislation was a complete
reversal of the legalized segregation which had prevailed only ten
years earlier. Yet, even at the height of the civil rights tide, when
Congress was debating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, issues were
arising which would turn congressional efforts away from imple-
menting school desegregation toward directly opposing it.
In large part the development of these issues stemmed from the
growing realization that school desegregation would be determined
by the answers to definitional problems. What is school desegrega-
tion? For example, if the racially segregated schools that existed in
the south had to be dismantled and replaced by "unitary" systems,
what, in fact, constitutes a "unitary" system? Practical and me-
chanical problems also were involved: are we going to transport
children to integrate schools if they live in racially segregated neigh-
borhoods? Finally, while the Supreme Court in Brown was con-
cerned with racially segregated school systems resulting from the
enactment of laws requiring or expressly sanctioning them (de jure
segregation) what of school segregation resulting from factors other
than state or local laws?
What if school segregation results from admiiistrative decisions
of school officials such as the location of school attendance lines,
selection sites for new schools and the size of particular schools,
made with the purpose and effect of maintaining racial separation,
but in the absence of ariy law requiring it?
What if school segregation results not from administrative deci-
sions of school officials, but from residential segregation for which
other state or local governmental bodies, such as local public hous-
ing authorities, urban renewal agencies, zoning boards and city
councils are responsible?
And what of school segregation that results from fortuitous fac-
tors, such as population shifts and other changes, in which govern-
ment officials have played no part? Does this form of de facto segre-
gation violate the Constitution?
21. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 13.
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These questions were present in some minds during the 1964 de-
bates, but with only 2.25 percent of the Negro children in the deep
South attending integrated schools (i.e., any school with less than
100 percent black enrollment), the focus of concern was on eliminat-
ing the blatant defiance of the Supreme Court which was evident
in the continuation of dual and racially-separate school systems.
This concern prepared the way for amendments to Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which closed off federal efforts to deal with
de facto and other forms of segregation brought about by means
other than de jure (as narrowly defined).
The strategy of those opposed in fact to desegregation but who
recognized the futility of a direct attack on the principles of Brown
v. Board of Education has been built around the thesis that Brown
merely commands racial neutrality in school admissions policies, no
more and no less. Once the pupil by pupil, case by case approach
fell, the opponents of desegregation recognized that the next line of
defense was to prevent the courts from examining whether or not
desegregation policies of school boards had in fact achieved any
desegregation at all. Their principle hope was pinned on the "free-
dom of choice" plans for desegregating schools. Under such plans
children were free to attend the school of their choice. Of course, no
whites freely choose to go to black schools which were publicly ac-
knowledged to be inferior. In many areas, only a handful of black
families were willing to risk the very real dangers of retaliations
involving loss of life, limb and employment of the breadwinner, to
send a child to white schools.22
A strong buttress of this strategy was the firmly held belief by its
champions in Congress that if northern school districts could be
forced to deal with their de facto segregated school districts, the
south would have a generous supply of allies who would assist in
defeating efforts to implement school desegregation and eventually
enact a rollback of desegregation altogether. The first fruit of this
alliance was the famous racial balance language found in the defini-
tion of "desegregation" 23 and in the limitations on the power of the
22. For an excellent account of the experience under freedom of choice plans, see U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 45-70 (1967).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (b) (1970):
"Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but "desegrega-
[Vol. 8:105
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Attorney General to bring suit to desegregate schools in Title IV.21
This joinder of northern and southern concerns is explicit in the
explanation of the amendment given by its sponsor in the House,
Representative Cramer (R-Fla.):
The purpose is to prevent any semblance of congressional acceptance
or approval of the concept of "defacto" [sic] segregation or to in-
clude in the definition of "desegregation" any balancing of school
attendance by moving students across school district lines to level off
percentages where one race outweighs another.
25
A series of incisive opinions by the courts have deprived the
amendment's southern supporters of their hope that it would effec-
tively bar desegregation of schools by plans other than freedom of
choice plans and similar token efforts. 21 It is my view that these
decisions were necessary in order to uphold the constitutionality of
the racial balance language of Title IV. Had the language of Title
IV been applied as Congressman Cramer had hoped it would, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have been rendered a nullity as far
as school desegregation is concerned. Such a decision would have
been a complete misreading of the hope and intent of Congress that
the schools of the land be desegregated through the Act.
For a number of years, efforts were made in Congress to restate
the limitations contained in Title IV in a way that would stop deseg-
regation.2 The legal effect of these efforts, and to a large extent their
practical results, had little or no impact on school desegregation,
tion" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome
racial imbalance.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (a) (1970):
Provided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States
to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the
transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district
to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing
power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards.
25. 110 CONG. REc. 2280 (1964).
26. The key decision was United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, Caddo Parrish School
Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
27. These efforts were the so-called "Whitten Amendments" attached to appropriations
bills in the House of Representatives and which forbade the use of federal funds to require
assignment or transportation of pupils. These proposals inevitably would be amended in the
Senate so that the limitations only prohibited officials from carrying out unconstitutional
directives.
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other than to encourage the north to continue to do nothing about
segregation of schools caused by state action in its own precincts.
The political effect, however, has been considerable.
The racial balance language of Title IV, the decisions limiting its
application, futile efforts in Congress to undo what has been accom-
plished, have nourished an unfortunate myth in certain regions of
the country that judges sitting in federal courthouses have cheated
the people out of their legislative victories. This has kept alive
sparks of resistance to desegregation in many pockets throughout
the south, and, as unconstitutional aspects of school segregation in
the north became increasingly apparent, it has fed flames of violent
resistance in such communities as Pontiac and Denver. Far worse,
it has prevented the possibility of rational discussion of how to
achieve desegregation fairly, without unduly interrupting the edu-
cation of young children. Instead, we seem to be wasting our time
by debating whether we will have desegregation at all. Out of this
ferment came the antibusing campaign of 1972.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenb erg Board of Education2 is credited
with feeding the emotional storm that swept many sections of the
country concerning busing.29 Yet, Swann also contained the formu-
lation for the practical and common sense limitation of busing, even
though few would, or could, listen to what the Court actually was
saying."
The formulation of Chief Justice Burger3' became the basic build-
ing block in the pupil transportation amendments to the General
Education Amendments of 1972 offered by myself and Senator
Mansfield. Basically, the amendment states that Congress believes
the objections to busing stated in Swann do have validity, indeed,
that busing funds may not be awarded where effectiveness of the
28. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
29. "Busing" meant only one thing, school desegregation, even though 20 million children
were bused to school daily in 1971 and buses traveled 2.2 billion miles, virtually all of it totally
unrelated to desegregation purposes. See U.S. COMMSSION ON CrvIL RIGHTS, YoUR CHILD AND
BUSING (1972).
30. Eventually, the real meaning of Swann began to become apparent, and I believe helped
to defeat the anti-busing bill in the 92d Congress.
31. The by-now classic statement reads:
An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance
of travel is so great as to either risk the health of children or significantly impinge on
the educational process.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (19711.
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educational process would be impeded by the time or distance of
travel.
In my view, Title VIII of the Education Amendments of 197232 sets
the limits on how far Congress can responsibly go in placing restric-
tions on pupil transportation to desegregate schools. The simple
scheme of the amendment ensures that federal officials cannot cir-
cumvent the reasonable standards for busing established by the
Supreme Court in Swann. It is aimed at preventing the sort of
extreme busing that critics fear can occur; it is not directed at
limiting the powers of the Court. It leaves open the "flexibility" and
"balance" necessary to implement desegregation in an equitable
,manner.
The defeat of the anti-busing legislation in the Senate in 1972 and
the virtually complete disestablishment of the separate school sys-
tems of the south marks the entrance of the country into a new era
in school desegregation which has been most clearly signalled by the
Court's decisions in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond33
and Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo..34 The era we are
in is the era of large city desegregation and of remedying segregation
of schools brought about by unconstitutional state action.
The constitutional problems of finding state action in northern
school de facto segregation are not difficult in my opinion, but devis-
ing a remedy is. In fact, it is the difficulty of developing an accepta-
ble and effective remedy that may be staying the Court's hand more
than the conceptual difficulties in defining the wrong.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Keyes35 is interesting and
hopeful, not because I necessarily agree with all of it, but because
it demonstrates fresh and major innovative thinking on the Court
about the problems of desegregation. Although the suspicious may
find many pitfalls in Justice Powell's opinion, its significance is in
the desegregation guidelines it establishes.
First, Justice Powell would obliterate the distinction between de
jure and de facto segregation on the grounds that state action always
is present in the operation of a segregated school system. In this view
32. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 372.
33. 93 S. Ct. 2773 (1973).
34. 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973).
35. Id. at 2701-20.
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he has the distinguished company of Justice Douglas36 and the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. 37
Second, Justice Powell defines the concept of "integrated school
system" in a way which allows continuance of all-black and all-
white schools under certain conditions. Presumably, we must look
to previous opinions of the Court to determine under what condi-
tions an all-white or an all-black School is constitutionally permissi-
ble. 38 But Justice Powell leaves no doubt that in his view the Consti-
tution does not require the elimination of individual schools which
have all-white or all-black or all-Chicano enrollments. An "integre-
gated school system" is one in which the following conditions are
present:
1) faculties and administrative staff are integrated;
2) equality of facilities and of education program exists;
3) school attendance zones have been drawn to promote integra-
tion;
4) new schools are located, old ones closed, and regrouped by size
and grade categories to promote integration;
5) if a district transports pupils, transportation must be carried
out with integration in mind.39
If a school district is found to be operating a segregated school
system, then it has an affirmative duty to achieve the above with
busing a possible remedy. In devising remedies courts would be
guided by equitable principles. As Justice Powell stated:
This would result . . . in no prohibition on court-ordered student
transportation in futherance of desegregation. But it would also re-
quire that the legitimate community interests in neighborhood school
systems be accorded far greater respect."
In developing remedies, courts would be asked to balance var-
ious competing considerations. Justice Powell pleads that courts
36. Id. at 2700.
37. U.S. COMMXSSION ON CrvIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLAMON IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
38. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2706-07 (1973).
39. Id. at 2706.
40. Id. at 2718.
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should give greater weight to the values of the neighborhood, to the
parental interest in education of their children, to the rights of
children and to the economic and social consequences of extensive
pupil transportation plans."
Justice Powell's suggestion that age per se should be a factor in
limiting busing warrants careful review. Ironically, integrated edu-
cation is more successful among the young, i.e., those under 12 years
of age, than among children of high school age.42 Experienced educa-
tors report that somewhere after the ninth grade, adolescents not
only segregate themselves by race, but by class and social back-
ground as well, these latter factors perhaps being more determina-
tive than race or color.
Special consideration is warranted where neighborhoods are al-
ready racially integrated. A priority exemption should be given to
such neighborhoods from any plan of desegregation which required
pupil transportation. Although neighborhoods are an integral part
of our urban life, we should keep in mind that the neighborhood
easily can be transmuted into "territory" or "turf" to be protected
at all costs, some of them too horrible to contemplate. Not all of
the best of our national character is expressed in the concept of
"neighborhood." One example is the tragic burning of a young
woman in Roxbury, Massachusetts, simply because she happened
to be of the wrong color at the wrong place at the wrong time. How-
ever, Justice Powell's concurrence in Keyes strengthens my confi-
dence that we can look to the courts to develop intelligent, fair and
effective remedies for desegregating schools. Justice Powell sets
forth our duty under the fourteenth amendment in positive terms
-to operate integrated school systems.
It should be remembered that school desegregation has not yet
reached the large numbers of minority group persons living in cities,
North, West and South.13 A new minority group, Mexican Ameri-
41. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2711-19 (1973).
42. DENMARK, GUTTENTAG & RILEY, COMMUNICATION PATTERNS AND INTEGRATED CLASSROOMS
AND PRE-INTEGRATION SUBJECr VARIABLES AS THEY AFFECT THE ACADEMMC AcHIVEMET AND
SELF-CONCEPT OF PREVIOUSLY SEGREGATED CHILDREN (1967); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVL IGHTS,
THE DIMINISHING BARRIER, A STUDY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN TEN CrIEs (1972).
43. The U.S. Bureau of the Census reports that nearly half the nation's population of
blacks is concentrated in 50 cities and at least one third of the total is in 15 cities. The top
15 cities are New York City, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington, Los Angeles, Balti-
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cans, is also involved as Keyes indicates. Its problems cannot be
equated automatically with those of the black-white desegregation
context of the south.4 An enormous task is involved which, if it is
not approached in a spirit of humility, will be overwhelming. Justice
Powell suggests some manageable guidelines by which lasting de-
segregation standards may be evolved.
We have breached the "massive resistance" of the Old South.
During the first Nixon Administration we completed the job of dis-
establishing the former dual and segregated school systems of the
past. What we now face is the challenge of operating integrated
school systems and of remedying school segregation wherever it ex-
ists.
While I may not agree with every particular in Justice Powell's
opinion, I believe that it offers a path which will enable us to achieve
desegregation without extreme social upheaval. If the movement
toward integration begun twenty years ago is not to be lost or set
back by reactionary backlash movements, then Justice Powell's
counsel should be heeded:
It is time to return to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized
interests of our society in achieving desegregation with other educa-
tional and societal interests a community may legitimately assert.
This will help assure that integrated school systems will be estab-
lished and maintained by rational action, will be better understood
and supported by parents and children of both races, and will pro-
mote the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential to its
genuine success. 5
The progress that has been made toward the goal of a just and
free society has been substantial. The tools for further advances in
achieving social justice can be formulated to produce rational and
flexible remedies to the complex problems that remain.
more, Cleveland, New Orleans, Atlanta, St. Louis, Memphis, Dallas, Newark and Indianapo-
lis.
44. On the subject of Mexican-American education see the five volume series of reports,
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERIcAN EDUCATION (1972).
45. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2719-20 (1973).
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